Table of contents
Articles
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Approval voting without ballot restrictions
Federica Ceron and Stéphane Gonzalez |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 759–775 |
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Simple bets to elicit private signals
Aurelien Baillon and Yan Xu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 777–797 |
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Revenue from matching platforms
Philip Marx and James Schummer |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 799–824 |
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Cooperative strategic games
Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 825–851 |
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When is a monotone function cyclically monotone?
Alexey I. Kushnir and Lev V. Lokutsievskiy |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 853–879 |
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Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility
Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Alexander Nesterov |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Errata 881–909 |
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Matching with floor constraints
Sumeyra Akin |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 911–942 |
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A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement
Simon Loertscher and Claudio Mezzetti |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 943–978 |
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Bounds on price setting
Narayana R. Kocherlakota |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 979–1015 |
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Bottleneck links, essential intermediaries and competing paths of diffusion in networks
Mihai Manea |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1017–1053 |
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Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite-player games
Guilherme Carmona and Konrad Podczeck |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1055–1093 |
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Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions
Carolina Manzano and Xavier Vives |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1095–1137 |
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Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
Yunan Li |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1139–1194 |