Table of contents
Articles
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Network structure and naive sequential learning
Krishna Dasaratha and Kevin He |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 415–444 |
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The no-upward-crossing condition, comparative statics, and the moral-hazard problem
Hector Chade and Jeroen M. Swinkels |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 445–476 |
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Delegating performance evaluation
Igor Letina, Shuo Liu, and Nick Netzer |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 477–509 |
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Mechanism design without quasilinearity
Tomoya Kazumura, Debasis Mishra, and Shigehiro Serizawa |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 511–544 |
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Bundlers' dilemmas in financial markets with sampling investors
Milo Bianchi and Philippe Jehiel |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 545–582 |
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Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect
Dino Gerardi and Lucas Maestri |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 583–623 |
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Multiplier effect and comparative statics in global games of regime change
Michal Szkup |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 625–667 |
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Equilibrium coalitional behavior
Mert Kimya |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 669–714 |
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Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent
Daniel Barron, George Georgiadis, and Jeroen M. Swinkels |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 715–761 |
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The construction of national identities
Milena Almagro and David Andrés-Cerezo |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 763–810 |
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Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information
Wei He and Yeneng Sun |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 811–859 |