Table of contents
Articles
|
Bargaining with evolving private information
Juan Ortner |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 885–916 |
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The winner-take-all dilemma
Kazuya Kikuchi and Yukio Koriyama |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 917–940 |
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Time-consistent fair social choice
Kaname Miyagishima |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 941–964 |
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Incentives in matching markets: counting and comparing manipulating agents
Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Alexander Nesterov |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 965–991 |
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Optimal allocations with α-MaxMin utilities, Choquet expected utilities, and Prospect Theory
Patrick Beissner and Jan Werner |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 993–1022 |
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All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Massó, and Alejandro Neme |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1023–1061 |
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Collective hold-up
Matias Iaryczower and Santiago Oliveros |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1063–1100 |
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Unrestricted information acquisition
Tommaso Denti |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1101–1140 |
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Strategic investment evaluation
Rishabh Kirpalani and Erik Madsen |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1141–1180 |
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On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion
Andrew Mackenzie and Christian Trudeau |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1181–1223 |
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Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents
Ozan Candogan and Philipp Strack |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1225–1269 |
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Which misspecifications persist?
Drew Fudenberg and Giacomo Lanzani |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1271–1315 |