Table of contents
Articles
|
A general framework for rational learning in social networks
Manuel Mueller-Frank |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1–40 |
|
Ergodic Markov equilibrium with incomplete markets and short sales
Luis H. B. Braido |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 41–57 |
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Scale-invariant uncertainty-averse preferences and source-dependent constant relative risk aversion
Costis Skiadas |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 59–93 |
|
Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
Peter Vida and Francoise Forges |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 95–123 |
|
The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games
Jing Chen and Silvio Micali |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 125–163 |
|
Refined best-response correspondence and dynamics
Dieter G. Balkenborg, Josef Hofbauer, and Christoph Kuzmics |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 165–192 |
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Managing pessimistic expectations and fiscal policy
Anastasios Karantounias |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 193–231 |
|
Hierarchical cheap talk
Attila Ambrus, Eduardo M. Azevedo, and Yuichiro Kamada |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 233–261 |